These assumptions provide the basis. If 1-3 and 5-6 were not true, there would be little hope for controlling the future, while if (4) were not true, there would be less (though not zero) need for action.

The problem we face is that several biologically and socially based tendencies deriving from the foregoing constants are out of control, and are likely to continue to be. The most important are those associated with scientific discovery and the technological manipulation of discovery. We do not know which discoveries already made and which discoveries to be made later in the millennium will be critical to either the emergence of catastrophic problems or the realization of profoundly remedial solutions.

Parallel and interacting with the threat of runaway technology, is the ideological unpreparedness of humanity. We have just passed through the eras of Nazism and Communism, but are yet to figure out how we dodged these bullets of civilizational disaster, and so have little clue as to how future, even more high velocity, bullets might be dodged.

Our unpreparedness is suggested by the uncomfortable bifurcation of ideological trajectories within many if not most societies. On the one hand, modernist, scientific, humanistic, and progressive segments of the population press forward with an ever-expanding agenda. On the other hand, narrow, inward and backward-looking segments reject the modernist society around them and attempt to press society back into the straitjackets of the past. Whether we look at Christian (especially in the United States), Jewish, Islamic, or Hindu societies, the bifurcation is the same. Unfortunately, the beliefs of neither strand are coherent, well- organized, or convincing.

The "progressives" range from modernized socialists dedicated to big government (whatever they may call it) to so-called "free market" advocates who would limit government to a minor umpiring role. Some of the latter are libertarians that are anarchists in all but name. This is particularly confusing when questions of the role of government in education, aid to the poor (internal or external), or the promotion of science come up.

The progressives, intent on leaving the past behind them, realize at the same time that enforceable limits must be placed on the actions of both individuals and groups. They are abstractly aware that developing children need limits and guidance. Yet they do not know where and how and why such limits are to be drawn.

The reactionaries are equally at sea. As the author Naipaul has so ably pointed out, the reactionary attempt to turn back the clock is more rhetorical than behavioral, more personal than societal. Unlike many other truly "conservative" movements, such as the Amish, reactionary leaders are quite willing to employ the gains of science in the service of their objectives. The reactionaries are also less than conservative in that they do not strive to actually return to a historical past, but strive instead to approximate an imaginary past that never existed. The women of medieval Islam did not live as the Taliban would have had them live, nor were the sexual patterns of medieval Christian societies as puritanical as Christian fundamentalists would have us strive for today.

The result of the bifurcation and indeterminacy of both strands, as well as the previously unimagined level of contact of peoples with one another and with one another's ideas and customs, is a pervading confusion in the lives of most people everywhere. The illiterate Afghani brought up with little abstract knowledge beyond what he has memorized from the Koran, ostensibly willing in word and deed to sacrifice his life for Allah, and to condemn his new wife to a lifeless and subordinate life, can be found dreaming of raising enough money to move to America, purchase a suburban house such as he has seen in the movies, and raise a family of American kids that may never hear of Islam.

His confusion is our confusion. Most people will never face the dramatic transitions he hopes for on alternate Mondays. But they do live in a confusing world lying somewhere between the trajectories, settling for a mishmash of beliefs about behavior, nutrition, sexual relations, and whether or not citizens should pay taxes.

It is not enough to say that humanity is simply having "growing pains". If we pause for a minute and try to understand what led to the excesses of National Socialism, Marxism- Leninism, Shinto revivalism, or the more recent fanatical bin Ladenism, we see two worrisome trends. First, millions of people are finding themselves in a world they can no longer understand, with symbols and organizations that no longer have meaning for them. They are emotionally and ideologically spent. They are ripe for any leader who promises to simplify reality for them, to tell them what is really right and wrong, what is worth fighting and dying for. Yes, promises of a particularly enticing heaven played some part in the willingness of Al Qaeda devotees to sacrifice their lives. But meanwhile, in Sri Lanka young Tamils have been recruited to blow themselves up for a more abstract, essentially nationalist, cause. The point is not the quality of the promise or the nature of the religion, but rather the attractiveness in this ideological desert of leaders who assert forcefully that there is an ideal worth being a martyr for. Japanese kamikaze pilots in World War II had more in common with the hijackers of 9/11 than is often admitted.

Unfortunately, the burning issue is not economic justice, not poverty, nor a too arrogant United States. The Aun Shunriko in Japan have used deadly assault on their fellows as a way of showing fealty to a leader who is primarily interested in noneconomic questions (however hazy his ideology may be to outsiders). It was not poverty that led to the Oklahoma City bombing. It was a skein of anti-state ideas, widely believed along the fringes of American society, that led an ideological maverick to place his truck outside a government building.

If the issues were poverty or U.S. foreign policy, then we could work toward their amelioration — and in any event we should work on reducing unnecessary irritants. But the key issues are outside such remedial steps. What we need is to understand what they are and how we might then address what we come to understand.

The urgent need to undertake this quest is suggested by three reflections.

First, in spite of the confusions of our day and the violent, terrorist movements that exist in our world, from a historical perspective we live in a time of peace and understanding. Up to now, no 21st century ideology has come onto the world scene that threatens to capture the adherence of millions as ideological movements did in the 20th century. But such an ideology will emerge. It will emerge from the confusion between the two trajectories of modern society. It will incorporate some reactionary features, but it will also express in a new and antihumanistic spirit futuristic elements, much as Fascism and Communism were able to do. While the Nazis, for example, glorified a mythical past, what they thought they were doing was taking certain assumptions of modern science (such as the determinative role of genetics or the sociological understanding of criminals) to their logical conclusion.

Second, the weapons of choice of radicals and fanatics in the future, whoever they may be, are likely to be much more destructive than those available to individuals and governments in the past century.

Third, the world has yet to develop a means by which it can restrict and contain individuals or groups that would encompass its destruction.

The second and third are the easiest problems to address, so we begin with these.

Since the nineteenth century, the dream of one world, of a universal political system, has been widely discussed, and efforts to implement it have been undertaken. Unfortunately, before it had a chance, two things had to happen. First, the world had to be divided into a system of more or less comparable states that could then be united without leaving too many out of the picture. In a very rough way, institutional growth in the twentieth century accomplished this task. Nearly everyone now lives in what passes for an independent nation-state. Second, the leaders and publics of the major states had to be willing to surrender significant degrees of sovereignty in areas such as defense, justice, or economic policy to persons outside their borders. This has been accomplished in Europe to a remarkable extent, but beyond Europe it is still a long way off. Certainly, there is no reason to think that major players such as China, the United States, or India are prepared for such a surrender of state self-determination.

But an effective world order need not require the sacrifice of self-determination rights by these states in the near future. What the situation demands is a system of "responsible" nation states and recognized superstates (such as Europe, and increasingly the United Nations). An effective world order would exist if all states in the world met the following criteria:

(1) Their governments are able to enforce national laws within their entire national territory.

(2) Their governments are able to enact laws or make decisions independently of other power sources in the society (for example, the army, intelligence services, mafia, religious authorities).

(3) Their governments do not ignore or dismiss international opinion, international pressure, or international decisions (such as those of the United Nations).

In other words, the world would be made up of states such as those that responded more or less effectively to the demands of the United States and the United Nations in the months following September 11.

It should be noted that democracy is not listed as one of the criteria for "responsible states". The standards of government associated with modern democracy are the right of all peoples, and eventually all peoples will demand and be granted effective democratic government. However, in the shorter run, which means much of the twenty-first century, democracy and responsibility should be viewed as somewhat different goals.

To take extremes, Singapore is a responsible state, but Singapore is not a democracy. Sri Lanka is a democracy, but until it can control the north, it is not a responsible state. Lebanon is more democratic than Jordan, but less responsible, for Lebanon is not able to control the many factions and movements within its borders as effectively as Jordan.

Responsibility is emphasized here, because whatever problem the international community addresses, whether it be terrorism, biological warfare, cloning human beings, global warming, or the AIDS epidemic, the discussion can move forward to effective action only to the extent it takes place within a world of responsible states.

This implies that the overriding international policy of responsible governments and super-governments must be to work energetically toward eliminating irresponsible government. Although we are acting without a clear overall strategy, the United States and its allies have acted since September 11 to move in this direction. We can only hope that the goal comes to be more clearly understood and is more decisively pursued over coming decades.

Establishing such a world will require difficult and unwelcome decisions. Helping states control their own territories and determining the boundaries of those territories will often be problematic. In Indonesia, for example, it could mean that we have to help the central government put down what may be legitimate independence movements. It may mean that we must place our modus vivendi with Saudi leaders in jeopardy: not because we demand democracy (which could be dangerous for both sides), but because we demand that the Saudi government exert more control over the religious fanatics that preach and teach extremism. It may mean that we play a more vigorous negotiating role, eventually compelling all sides to devise and accept effective peace agreements, in such hot spots as Kashmir, Palestine, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Haiti.

This policy also means that we will have to mobilize the international community to move decisively to change the governments in those states that have defied international law or have been unable to provide their own people with the services that the government clearly could afford. North Korea, Myanmar, and several African "states" are high on such a list. As long as these states exist in their present forms, the decisions we make about trafficking in drugs or nuclear materials, or the limits we wish to place on scientific experiments, or whatever critical issues the future thrusts upon us, will be simply unenforcible. Unfortunately, in the case of North Korea, we cannot delay action for too long, for the costs of intervention may soon escalate beyond what even a determined world would contemplate.

In spite of America's eagerness to invade Iraq, successful action in pursuit of this policy will seldom require massive invasion. The Taliban were defeated in Afghanistan with limited international force. The collapse of the USSR without an attack and more recent Libyan actions suggest that largely peaceful means may often be adequate. But whatever solutions or methods we decide on, we must not simply let the matter drift.

When we say "we", we mean the United States and its allies, as well as the supernational organizations that we work through. But whatever the organizational framework, for the foreseeable future it is unlikely much will be accomplished unless the United States plays a leadership role.

The infeasibility of effectively controlling weapons of mass destruction while insisting that they are important for the defense of the United States was clear throughout the cold war period. Since the end of the cold war, the weakness of our position has become clearer. If we actually believe that we can prevent attacks on the United States through possessing and threatening, in extremis, to use them, then we have little reason other than our greater power and "virtue" to claim our right to the weapons while we deny this right to others. This weakness in our position was highlighted when India's testing of its well-known nuclear capability was followed by a test of Pakistan's less well-known capability. The short-term deterioration of relations between these countries and the realization of the fragility of Pakistan's internal political structure makes the need for America to rethink its policy even clearer.

In a structured world in which neither the United States nor the USSR were led by fanatics, many could rest comfortably with the nuclear threat. The President could be humorously followed wherever he went by a little man carrying the trigger to our nuclear arsenal. Today in a world with less structured relationships, the humour has lost its edge. (One wonders, for example, just how difficult it might be for a small well-trained group of fanatics to actually steal that bag for a few minutes. I do not know precisely what is in the bag — if anything, but the possession of such a "weapon" in the hands of a terrorist for even a short time would be another major shock to our complacency.)

It is more than ever apparent that the only way to effectively control weapons of mass destruction is to define this class of weapons clearly, and then state clearly that neither we nor our allies will ever use them "in anger" or even as a potential threat against those who would use them against us. (For example, would we really have wiped out Afghanistan if bin Laden had had the weapon, or threatened us, or hit us? What would the vast mass of Afghanis have had to do with his "crime"? If we were to make such a use, would not bin Laden in his fanaticism been pleased that we had killed this many Muslims, thereby perhaps uniting the Islamic world?).

Much the same argument can be made for the lesser (as of now) chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, as well as those we have not heard of that will come later in the millennium.

If we were to verbally disarm ourselves by forswearing the use of weapons of mass destruction, we could move more effectively toward the rapid, universal destruction and prohibition of these weapons. Our bargaining position would be greatly strengthened. We could justify as we never could before the future development of weapons and capabilities such as ABM that would reduce the effect of attacks should they come.

This renunciation by the United States and its allies should also be combined with a strong policy to force inspections and weapons controls where this has not been possible until now. Leaving countries such as North Korea outside an international system that renounces the use of weapons of mass destruction makes less and less sense as time passes. Our renunciation would allow the United States to make this argument more effectively than we have in the past.

The conventional and unconventional forces (such as CIA and Special Force intervention units) of the United States (and soon hopefully its allies) are stronger than ever and must be kept so. They have always been our real deterrent. If in the future we have to punish those who use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction, from this new posture we could employ these tools with much less diplomatic and humanitarian cost.

China would present the only real threat in a world in which we have renounced weapons of mass destruction. It is conventionally much weaker than we are, but it is very large, technologically sophisticated, and has many more nuclear weapons than any other state likely to stand outside a general reduction. None of the threats and levers that we could use against the rest of the world can be reliably used against China in the near future. We can only hope that we are gradually able to include China in an international system of ideas and assumptions and governmental responsibility that makes it possible for China and the United States to reach the level of reciprocation that has developed between the United States and Russia.

The last and most important issue is the strengthening of ideological defenses against the fanaticism that is sure to threaten us all long before the present century is out. Confused peoples in rapidly changing societies — and we are all now in rapidly changing societies — will be looking for saviours, leaders who simplify and make sense of the mass of information that is overwhelming them. Many of these leaders will be religious leaders; many will be nationalist extremists; most will be harmless, even well-meaning. But among them will arise individuals smarter and better organized than bin Laden, more attuned to the modern world than Al Qaeda, more able to mobilize people in the millions instead of the thousands, and thus far more dangerous to humanity. Bin Laden and his people talked with confidence and braggadocio, but their surprisingly feeble worldwide effectiveness since 9/11 suggests that they have been stretched to the limit, and that their technological expertise remains quite primitive. We may not be as fortunate with their successors.

How can we prepare on this front? The frequency of violent escapades by the endlessly unhappy and unappreciated within our own society, at every level of living or sophistication, suggests that we can only reduce, not eliminate, the danger.

The first plank in our ideological platform must be support for a high standard of universal education throughout our society and the world. Public education available to freely and equally to all has long been the goal all developed societies, and it is a worthwhile goal. No one should grow up in this country or any modern society within a tightly controlled educational world, whether it be Hassidic, traditional Catholic, Mormon, or home-schooled southern Baptist. Everyone should have the opportunity to keep up with the knowledge of the world that is available to at least the mainstream. If this is true of the United States, it is equally true of the rest of the world. The madressahs of Pakistan that developed fuel for the Taliban existed in part because of the failure of Pakistan's educational system (as well as welfare system) to reach all potential students. In the long run, such educational failure hurts us as much as it hurts the countries where the uneducated or poorly educated live.

Unfortunately, remedying this is only the first step. Even in societies with universal education, even where 50% or more attend "college", frightening ignorance remains endemic. Most people just "do not know" basic facts about the way the world works or how science is done, or what is a proof and what is not. They are ignorant because when they were in school, or later in the work world, they did not become emotionally focused on learning unless that learning was directly connected to what they were doing at the time. Becoming, for example, a computer expert, a software designer perhaps, is not easy. It requires great concentration and enormous attention to detail. And yet so many of these highly educated people, outside the confines of their profession have little curiosity and remarkably little general knowledge.

We know, however, that at some point in the lives of such persons, their interest may be suddenly heightened by a personal experience, a personal friendship, or a different mode of presentation. Suddenly such individuals reach out, and unfortunately when such persons reach out for intellectual food, for answers, they are often offered tragically unbalanced diets.

Much of the education of the next generation, and probably much of the mobilization of ideological extremists, will take place in the commons of the internet. This suggests that we all, as citizens and governments, have a responsibility to monitor what is on the internet and to make rapid responses wherever and whenever mistakes, errors, and nonsense are being propagated. There must, in other words, be a wide spectrum of "truth squads" in all languages and at all levels, to politely but effectively counter the nonsense that is available only too easily on the internet in its specialized sites and chat rooms.

To this point, our discussion has been negative and defensive. We need now to conceive of a more positive ideological effort to create and propagate ideals and beliefs that will both be able to grow and mature with changing times and provide anchors and guide posts for successive generations. This suggests that the future would be best served by the propagation of a constellation of progressive ideologies attractive to people at different cultural and economic levels, and to people with different types of personalities or psychological needs. The ideologies in this constellation will be constructed primarily from materials that already exist, but new foundations will also have to be laid down.

This ideological effort cannot be purely intellectual. It must combine action and thought, study and symbolism, even ritual. But perhaps more than anything else, it must be able to produce leaders, living and dead, with which successive generations can identify. Movements without emotional links to persons living and dead will never fill the void that opens in so many lives.

Here we must stop. The author is not going to define an ideology or a cluster of ideologies for the future. This is the long-term task of the intellectual community, perhaps it can be the work of those who later contribute to this web site, and participate in its discussions. The need is clear, but how and to what effect it will be met, only the future will know.